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The Future of the Federal Common Law of Foreign 
Relations  
INGRID WUERTH* 
The federal  common law  of foreign relations has  been in decline  for 
decades. The field was built in part on the claim that customary interna-
tional law is federal common law and in part on the claim that federal 
judges should displace state law when they conclude that it poses difficul-
ties for U.S. foreign relations. Today, however, customary international 
law is generally applied based upon the implied intentions of Congress, 
rather than its free-standing status as federal common law, and judicial 
evaluation of foreign policy problems has largely been replaced by reli-
ance upon presidential or congressional action, or by standard constitu-
tional analysis.  
Two traditional areas of federal common law–immunity and the act 
of state doctrine–are alive and well doctrinally.   Their status as federal 
common law is somewhat unsteady, however, because the Court has not 
provided  a  convincing  account  of  why  these  two  topics should  be  gov-
erned by federal common law, and because the traditional foundation for 
federal common law has eroded.  Anthony Bellia Jr. and Bradford Clark  
have  argued in  The  Law of Nations and the United States Constitution 
that  the  Constitution itself  requires  courts  to apply  customary  interna-
tional law in these two areas, but their argument fails to convince.  A bet-
ter approach is to justify federal common law as necessary to give effect 
to the very closely-related statutory framework governing foreign sover-
eign  immunity,  and  because judicial lawmaking  is also  cabined  by  the 
content of customary international law and by some actions of the execu-
tive  branch.  The federal  common law  of  foreign relations  does  have  a 
future, but it depends neither upon the status of customary international 
law as federal common law nor upon judicial decision-making about the 
deleterious effect of state law upon U.S. foreign policy.    
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INTRODUCTION 
What does the future hold for the federal common law of foreign relations? 
Foreign relations is often described as one of the best established and most legiti-
mate enclaves of federal common law, but its overall scope and effect have been 
declining  for  decades.  Issues  that  were  once  characterized  as federal  common 
law are increasingly resolved based on statutes, the Constitution, or actions by the 
President. The shrinking of common law in the area of foreign affairs forms part 
of some broader trends in foreign relations and constitutional law, including an 
increase in formalism, a growth in the difficulties in distinguishing foreign from 
domestic cases, and an overall normalization of the foreign relations field. These 
trends  weaken  arguments  that  foreign relations  issues  pose  unique problems 
requiring special doctrinal treatment; those arguments have often been used to 
justify the federal common law of foreign relations. Federal common law does 
seem alive  and relatively well  in  narrow  areas  of  foreign relations, including 
cases involving the act of state doctrine and certain issues related to foreign sov- 
ereign immunity.  
Yet the Supreme Court seems hesitant to refer to the act of state doctrine as 
federal common law, and it has not fully explained the basis for applying federal 
common law in immunity-related cases. Continuing in a long tradition of aca-
demic commentary critical of federal common law, an important new book by 
Professors Anthony J. Bellia Jr. and Bradford R. Clark,  The Law of Nations and  
the United States Constitution, seeks to further shrink the field by arguing that the 
act of state and immunity doctrines should be treated as unusual forms of consti-
tutionally mandated law, not judge-made federal common law. 1  The argument 
has implications for general common law, for foreign relations law as a field, and 
for formalist  approaches  to constitutional  interpretation.  But  it  is ultimately 
unconvincing. Courts should continue to apply judge-made federal common law 
in  act  of  state  and  immunity related  cases, although  for  different  reasons  than 
scholars and courts have sometimes given.  
1.  ANTHONY J. BELLIA JR. & BRADFORD R. CLARK, THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES  
CONSTITUTION (2017).  
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins left unclear 
the constitutional  basis  for general  common law, 2  but  the  Court  continues  to 
make federal law in special enclaves, including foreign relations. The enclaves as 
a group are sometimes defended as covering topics that are “federalized by force 
of  the  Constitution itself,”  thus resolving  some  doubts  about  their validity. 3 
Writing in that general tradition, but in some respects taking the argument farther, 
Bellia  and Clark  maintain  that  the  Constitution itself  requires  courts  to apply 
some, but not all, customary international law as federal common law. 4 Bellia 
and Clark reconceptualize the act of state and immunity doctrines as constitution-
ally compelled applications of customary international law. Customary interna-
tional law is not itself constitutional law, under this theory, but the Constitution 
grants to the federal political branches the exclusive power over some kinds of 
customary international law.  Courts  and  states must apply  that law unless  and 
until the political branches elect to change it. 
Bellia and Clark build their case on a fascinating historical analysis of the rela-
tionship between customary international law (or, to use the older term, the law 
of nations) and the U.S. Constitution. They argue that the Constitution relates in 
different ways to three historically distinct branches of customary international 
law: the law merchant, the law maritime, and the law of state-state relations. 5 The 
historical  categories  have  contemporary  significance.  The  modern  customary 
international law governing human rights has no historical counterpart, and thus 
is not federal law. 6 The modern customary international law of state-state rela-
tions, on the other hand, not only may, according to Bellia and Clark, but must, 
be applied by courts as a matter of constitutional command, as a function of the  
recognition power.7  The act of state and immunity doctrines serve as their pri-
mary examples. 8 
The law governing acts of state and some forms of immunity is constitutionally 
compelled, Bellia and Clark argue, because the political branches have exclusive 
control over recognition under the Constitution. 9  Once a foreign state is recog-
nized, courts must apply the act of state and immunity doctrines. The argument 
explicitly constitutionalizes the two doctrines. Act of state and non-statutory im-
munity cases arise under federal law for jurisdictional purposes not because they 
apply judge-made federal common law, but instead because they arise under the   
2.  304 U.S. 64, 78–80 (1938). 
3. Alfred Hill, The  Law-Making  Power  of  the Federal  Courts: Constitutional  Preemption ,  67  
COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1031 (1967).  
4.  BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at xii–vi, 149–50.  
5.  Id. at 1–2.  
6.  Id. at 189–211.  
7.  Id. at 189–91.  
8.  Id.  
9.  Id. at 170  (“Because  the Constitution itself gives the political branches  the power to recognize 
foreign nations, the exercise of that power requires state and federal courts alike to uphold the traditional  
sovereign rights of such nations as an incident of recognition.”).  
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Constitution itself. 10 The law applied by federal courts is supreme over state law 
because the Constitution itself is supreme. 11 State and federal courts do not make 
federal common law related to immunity and the act of state doctrine; instead, 
they are constitutionally obligated to apply customary international law to respect 
the sovereign rights of foreign countries recognized by the political branches. 
Constitutionalizing  the  act  of  state  and  immunity  doctrines would  further 
shrink the scope of foreign relations common law and resolve formalist objec- 
tions to the act of state and immunity doctrines as part of post-Erie common law, 
as described in Part I below. It would also have the effect of undermining the fed-
eral common law of foreign relations and even general federal common law by  
shrinking the scope of both.12 Despite its formal attractions, the argument is ulti-
mately unsuccessful as a modern approach to the federal common law of foreign 
relations.13 As described in Part II, the thesis relies too heavily on a recognition 
power  that  is hardly recognizable. Bellia  and Clark  argue  that  the  recognition 
power is exclusive to the federal political branches, and that the recognition power 
includes respect for the rights and immunities of foreign nations. But the Court has 
recently held that the recognition power is exclusive to the President. 14 That hold-
ing  means  that  the  rights  and  immunities  of  foreign  nations  which  may follow  
from recognition—such as act of state and immunity—have a different constitu-
tional source than recognition itself, contrary to Bellia and Clark’s argument. In  
effect, their argument is an unconvincing attempt to create an important, and pre-
viously  unknown, constitutional  power  that  gives  the federal political  branches 
exclusive power over the rights that follow from recognition. 
The constitutional argument also relies upon an inaccurate description of how 
customary international law  and related  doctrines  are actually  interpreted  and 
applied, as described in Part III. Courts do not merely implement a preexisting 
body of international legal rights that follow from the political act of recognition. 
Instead, they are making law that is informed—but not dictated—by customary 
international law. The upshot, as described in Part IV, is that with respect to im-
munity and the act of state doctrines, the current law as an enclave of preemptive, 
judge-made federal common law offers a better approach, one that is based on an  
10.  BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 176 (“[T]he Constitution sometimes requires courts to apply 
the law of state-state relations to uphold the rights of recognized foreign nations  0 0 0 the denial of such 
rights raises a question arising under the Constitution and supports federal question jurisdiction.”).  
11.  Id.  at  xxi  (“[T]he  Constitution’s exclusive allocation  of  powers  to  the political  branches  to 
recognize foreign nations has been understood to require courts and U.S. states to uphold the rights of 
recognized foreign nations under the law of state-state relations”); see also id . at 43, 53, 57, 82, 103–04,  
170, 174, 230. 
12.  In  their  book, Bellia  and Clark  do  not spell  out  the implication  of  their  arguments  for federal 
common law generally  or  for  the federal  common law  of  foreign relations  in particular.  The  authors 
discuss federal common law in their other works.  See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark,  The 
Law of Nations as Constitutional Law , 98 VA. L. REV. 729, 738–39, 830–31 (2012); Bradford R. Clark, 
Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation , 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1251, 1292–1306 (1996). 
13.  For an evaluation of the historical arguments see Michael D. Ramsey,  The Constitution’s Text 
and Customary International Law , 106 GEO. L.J. 1747 (2018).  
14.  Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2089 (2015).  
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accurate description of the recognition power, of leading foreign relations cases, 
and of the actual process of resolving cases. It is also an approach which permits 
courts the flexibility to give effect to closely related statutory provisions. 
If successful, Bellia  and Clark’s  thesis would help  demonstrate  that formal 
methods of constitutional interpretation such as originalism and textualism do not 
require a wholesale rejection of modern doctrine and would preserve some fed-
eral common law while discarding what is not reconceived as a direct application 
of the Constitution. But formalists should not be convinced. Contorting the recog-
nition power and modern case law to match the Bellia and Clark constitutional-
ism thesis is an unattractive option. As others have noted, formalist objections to 
federal common law generate pressure to twist the Constitution’s meaning; 15 that 
pressure also applies to precedent. It is better to conclude that state law should 
apply, or to argue that the constitutionalism thesis should be implemented despite 
its inconsistency with the Court’s leading cases. Best of all, however, would be to 
accept the power of federal courts to make common law in act of state and immu-
nity-related cases based upon precedent, the need to give effect to closely-related 
statutory regimes, and the limited range of judicial lawmaking involved.  
I. THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF  FOREIGN RELATIONS: A SHRINKING FIELD  
After the Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins ,16 federal common 
law has famously lacked a clear constitutional basis, although the Court continues 
to make federal law in special enclaves. 17 Arguments against those enclaves per-
sist. Federal common law, meaning here judge-made law that preempts state law 
and gives rise to federal question jurisdiction, 18 is in tension, or outright conflict, 
with  the  Supremacy Clause, Article  III,  and  separation  of  powers  in  the  U.S.  
Constitution.19 Article III does not explicitly list federal common law as provid-
ing the basis for the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and the Supremacy Clause  
15.  See Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal Common Law , 101 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2015) 
(noting that “[a]s a practical matter . . . reluctance to recognize federal common law creates pressure to 
interpret written federal laws in ways that depart from the tenets of textualism and originalism”);  see 
also Stephen E. Sachs, The “Unwritten Constitution” and Unwritten Law, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1797, 
1845 (“If every issue of constitutional magnitude has to be settled by the text itself, then we’ll end up 
‘interpreting’ (some might say ‘twisting’) the text into expressing a great deal that it doesn’t say.”).  
16.  304 U.S. 64 (1938).  
17.  See Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1680 (2018) (noting that the Court has applied “special 
enclaves of federal common law.”). 
18.  This Article does not discuss federal common law doctrines that do not preempt state law, such as  
forum non conveniens or recognition of judgments. See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 443  
(1994) (forum non conveniens); Comm’ns Imp. Exp. S.A. v. Congo, 757 F.3d 321, 322 (D.C. Cir. 2014)  
(recognition of judgments); see also  Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law , 94 VA. L. REV.  
813, 814–15 (2008).  
19.  See Michael D. Ramsey, The Supremacy Clause, Original Meaning, and Modern Law , 74 OHIO  
ST.  L.J.  559,  568  (2013)  (noting  the  conflict  with  the  Supremacy Clause);  Ingrid  Wuerth,  Foreign 
Official Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case Against  the State Department , 51 VA. J.  
INT’L L. 915, 954–55 (2011) (surveying constitutional objections to the federal common law of foreign 
relations); Notes and Comments, Federal Common Law and Article III: A Jurisdictional Approach to  
Erie, 74 YALE L.J. 325, 331 (1964) (noting the conflict with Article III).  
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does not list federal common law as preempting state law; both instead use the  
phrase “the Laws of the United States.”20  Furthermore, the separation of powers 
principle  gives  Congress,  not  the federal  courts,  the  power  to  make law. 21 
Because of these problems, some formalist and originalist scholars maintain that 
the federal common law of foreign relations should be scrapped entirely in favor 
of state law, 22 just as some argue that federal common law is illegitimate as a 
whole.23 Others disagree, of course, on the extent to which the Constitution poses 
barriers to federal common law. 24 
Foreign relations  is  sometimes  viewed  as  the  most defensible  or legitimate 
area of federal common law, in part because applying state law appears to be an 
unattractive option in the areas related to foreign policy and relations with foreign 
states, and in part because the federal government is sometimes said to have espe-
cially broad constitutional power over foreign relations issues. 25 Federal courts 
have accordingly developed their own common law rules on topics including the  
act of state doctrine,26  immunity,27 the separate juridical status of foreign states 
and their agencies and instrumentalities, 28 customary international law, 29 the dor-
mant Foreign  Commerce Clause,  and the preemption  of state  foreign relations 
activities through judicial decision making, also known as dormant foreign affairs  
preemption.30 Although some other areas of federal common law are authorized 
by federal statute, the federal common law of foreign relations is based in part on 
structural implications of the Constitution and in part on the claim that foreign 
relations issues are, as whole, “uniquely federal in nature.” 31 
The distinction between constitutional law and some parts of federal common 
law is thin, especially in the areas of dormant foreign affairs judicial preemption  
20.  U.S.  CONST.  art.  III,  §  2, cl.  1;  id.  art.  VI, cl.  2. Article  VI  adds  “which shall  be  made  in 
pursuance”  of  the  Constitution,  which arguably  means  that  the  phrase  is  narrower  in  the Article  VI 
context than in the Article III context.  Id.; see also infra  notes 184–200 and accompanying text.  
21.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; see Alfred Hill,  The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 NW. U. L.  
REV. 427, 441 (1958); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts , 52 U. CHI. L.  
REV. 1, 19–24 (1985); see also infra  notes 219–22 and accompanying text.  
22.  See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism , 83 VA. L. REV.  
1617, 1664–98 (1997).  
23.  See, e.g., Merrill,  supra note 21.  
24.  See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law , 99 HARV. L.  
REV. 881, 887–88 (1986) (suggesting that “judicial power to act is not limited to particular enclaves and 
that  it  is  much  broader  than  the usual  references  to judicial  power would  suggest”);  Henry Paul  
Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism ,  110  COLUM.  L.  REV.  731,  741  (2010)  (“It  is  quite 
implausible to think that the Supremacy Clause addressed this body of law at all . . . .”).  
25.  See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 424 (1964); Hill,  supra note 3, at 1042–  
61.  
26.  E.g., Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 424.  
27.  E.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 1047 (2010).  
28.  E.g.,  First Nat’l  City  Bank  v.  Banco  Para el  Comercio  Exterior  de  Cuba,  462  U.S.  611,  623  
(1983).  
29.  E.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980).  
30.  See Goldsmith, supra note 22, at 1625–31 (describing dormant Foreign Commerce Clause and 
foreign affairs preemption as forms of federal common law).  
31.  Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 424.  
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of state foreign relations activities and the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, 
neither of which has been identified by the Supreme Court as involving federal 
common law. Writing in the late 1990s, Professor Jack Goldsmith  argued that 
cases in these two categories involved reasoning comparable to the reasoning in 
cases in which the Court was more explicit about applying federal common law,  
such  as  the  act  of  state  doctrine.32 In all  three  areas, federal  judges  exercised 
broad power to displace state law based on their independent analysis of the for-
eign relations implications of applying state law. 33 In this sense, dormant foreign 
affairs preemption and dormant Foreign Commerce Clause preemption also con-
stituted judge-made federal law drawn loosely from the constitutional structure. 
Goldsmith noted that the Court might be moving toward the elimination of the 
federal  common law  of  foreign relations, 34  citing  W.S.  Kirkpatrick  &  Co.   v. 
Environmental  Tectonics  Corp., International ,35 which limited  the  act  of  state  
doctrine, and Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California ,36 which 
eschewed common law reasoning and refused to preempt state law under the dor-
mant Foreign Commerce Clause. 
That  trend  has  continued.  The  Court  has  not applied  the  dormant  Foreign 
Commerce Clause to strike down a state law since 1992, 37 and it has not applied 
dormant foreign affairs preemption to strike down a state law since 1968, despite 
opportunities  to apply  both.  In  the lower  court  decision  in Crosby  v. National 
Foreign Trade Council ,38 for example, the First Circuit applied both doctrines to 
invalidate a Massachusetts statute limiting trade with Burma by Massachusetts  
government agencies.39 The Supreme Court affirmed, but on different grounds.40 
Instead of applying, or even discussing, federal common law doctrines, it relied 
on standard statutory preemption and concluded in somewhat strained analysis 
that a federal law sanctioning Burma preempted the Massachusetts statute. 41 The 
Supreme  Court  has  discussed  dormant  Foreign  Commerce Clause  preemption 
only once since the 2000  Crosby decision.42 Lower courts have applied it infre-
quently  and usually with standard analysis from domestic interstate commerce 
cases, with little or no assessment of the impact of the state laws on U.S. foreign   
32. See generally Goldsmith, supra note 22.  
33.  Id. at 1629–31, 1637.  
34.  Id. at 1624.  
35.  493 U.S. 400 (1990).  
36.  512 U.S. 298 (1994).  
37.  See Kraft Gen. Foods v. Iowa Dept. of Rev., 505 U.S. 71 (1992).  
38.  530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
39. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 1999).  
40.  Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388.  
41.  Id. at 372–88.  
42.  Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003); see Leanne M. Wilson,  The Fate of the 
Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause After  Garamendi and Crosby, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 746, 748 (2007) 
(arguing that the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause has been “severely restricted” by  Garamendi and  
Crosby).  Courts  are apparently  hesitant  to apply  the  Foreign  Commerce Clause  at all.  See  Scott 
Sullivan, The Future of the Foreign Commerce Clause , 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1955, 1970 (2015).  
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relations.43 Thus, much of the common law-like reasoning in dormant Foreign 
Commerce Clause cases has been replaced by statutory preemption and standard 
constitutional analysis.  
The Supreme Court considered dormant foreign affairs preemption in its 2003  
decision American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi,44 with the four-Justice dissent 
explicitly distancing itself from  Zschernig, the only Supreme Court case which 
has applied the doctrine. 45  The majority opinion in Garamendi also questioned  
Zschernig’s reasoning and did not rely on foreign affairs preemption in holding 
that the California state statute was preempted by the actions of the President—a 
clear step away from common law-like judicial preemption. 46 And several years 
later, the Court limited  Garamendi itself to cases involving the settlement of for-
eign claims by the President. 47 Lower courts, especially in the Ninth Circuit, have 
continued to apply the foreign affairs preemption doctrine based in part on an in-
dependent assessment of the state law’s impact on U.S foreign policy, 48 although 
some cases also involve more analysis of the Constitution and the specific foreign 
affairs powers it confers on federal government. 49  
The Supreme Court has provided a statutory basis for another important area of 
the federal common law of foreign relations: customary international law as applied  
43.  See,  e.g.,  Hartford  Enters.,  Inc.  v.  Coty,  529  F.  Supp.  2d  95,  106  (D.  Me.  2008) (applying  
Younger abstention  to  avoid resolving  dormant  Foreign  Commerce Clause  issue).  A  district  court  in 
Florida struck down a statute under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, but the Eleventh Circuit  
affirmed based on statutory preemption. Odebrecht Const., Inc. v. Prasad, 876 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1318– 
19 (S.D. Fla. 2012),  aff’d sub nom. Odebrecht Const., Inc. v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 715 F.3d 
1268, 1287 (11th Cir. 2013). Courts have also struck down state statutes that impact foreign commerce  
using  reasoning  drawn  from  interstate  commerce  cases.  See,  e.g.,  Piazza’s  Seafood World,  LLC  v. 
Odom, 448 F.3d 744, 750 (5th Cir. 2006); Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Wayne, 303 F. Supp. 2d  
835, 848 (E.D. Mich. 2004); cf. Antilles Cement Corp. v. Fortu ₭no, 670 F.3d 310, 328–29, 331 (1st Cir. 
2012) (limiting the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause through a market-participant exception, but also 
striking down a Puerto Rican statute under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause). 
44.  539 U.S. 396, 439–40 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“We have not relied on  Zschernig since it 
was decided, and I would not resurrect that decision here.”). 
45.  Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).  
46.  Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 417–20 (majority opinion); see David H. Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98  
MINN. L. REV. 953, 968 (2014) (noting that the Supreme Court has “cast doubt” on the current standing  
of dormant foreign affairs preemption). 
47. Medellı ´n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 530–31 (2007).  
48.  See,  e.g.,  Gingery  v.  City  of Glendale,  831  F.3d  1222,  1230–31  (9th  Cir.  2016) (upholding 
actions of a city because they lacked a demonstrable effect on foreign affairs); Movsesian v. Victoria 
Versicherung AG, 670 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir. 2012) (striking down a California statute because it 
“has  ‘more  than  some incidental  or  indirect  effect’  on  foreign  affairs”  by  “express[ing]  a  distinct 
political point of view on a specific matter of foreign policy”) (citing  Zschering, 389 U.S. at 434); Von  
Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir. 2010) (striking down a 
state statute which was not enacted in an area of traditional state responsibility because “[b]y opening its 
doors as a forum to all Holocaust victims and their heirs to bring Holocaust claims in California against 
‘any museum or gallery’ whether located in the state or not, California has expressed its dissatisfaction 
with the federal government’s resolution (or lack thereof) of restitution claims arising out of Word [sic]  
War II”).  
49.  See, e.g., Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 712 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding a California statute 
unconstitutional “because it intrudes on the federal government’s exclusive power to make and resolve 
war, including the procedure for resolving war claims”).  
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in Alien Tort Statute (ATS) cases. The ATS is a jurisdictional statute that allows ali-
ens to sue in federal district court for torts in violation of the law of nations. 50  The  
ATS does not create a cause of action.51 ATS cases brought against aliens do not sat-
isfy the constitutional requirements for diversity jurisdiction because the Supreme 
Court has construed Article III as authorizing diversity suits only between a citizen 
of a state and an alien. 52 Lower courts concluded that customary international law is 
itself federal common law and that ATS cases thus arise under federal law. 53 In Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain ,  however,  the  Court  reasoned  that  with  the  ATS,  Congress 
authorized the courts to recognize “a claim under the law of nations as an element of 
common law.” 54 Although  courts still apply federal  common law  in  ATS  cases, 
including  the  creation  of  a federal  common law  cause  of  action,  they  do  so  not 
because customary international law has freestanding status as federal common law, 
but instead because Congress has delegated lawmaking power to the courts. 55 In this 
way, the ATS is like the Labor Management Relations Act, which also delegates 
lawmaking authority through a grant of jurisdiction. 56 Although the creation of a 
federal common law cause of action in ATS cases is now based on a statutory grant 
of power, the Court has still read the statutory grant narrowly, consistent with its 
general skepticism about some forms of federal common law. 57 
The  trend  away  from  common law  reasoning  in  foreign relations  cases  is 
related to broader developments in the field. In general, the Court has normalized 
its approach to foreign relations law over the past several decades, meaning that it 
does not treat all  foreign relations  cases as  presenting  an exceptional  need  for 
federal control, 58 a principle at the heart of the traditional federal common law of 
foreign relations. 59 Relatedly,  the  Court  has increasingly relied  upon formalist   
50.  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
51.  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004). 
52.  Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12, 14 (1800).  
53.  See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980).  
54.  542 U.S. at 725. 
55.  Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, 
and the Continuing Relevance of  Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 894–96 (2007).  
56.  See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957).  
57.  See, e.g., Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1402 (2018) (holding that the ATS does not 
extend liability over foreign corporations and noting “this Court’s general reluctance to extend judicially  
created  private  rights  of  action”);  id.  at  1413  (Gorsuch,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and  concurring  in  the 
judgment) (“Adopting new causes of action may have been a ‘proper function for common-law courts,’ 
but it is not appropriate ‘for federal tribunals’ mindful of the limits of their constitutional authority.”  
(citation omitted)); see also Paul B. Stephan, Inferences of Judicial Lawmaking Power and the Law of  
Nations, 106 GEO. L. J. 1793, 1816 (“Of significance is the Sosa Court’s recognition that, although it 
invoked a prescriptive inference for the first time in fifty years to justify its holding, such inferences are 
problematic.”).  
58.  Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law , 128 HARV. L.  
REV. 1897, 1910–11, 1942–46 (2015).  
59.  See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 
376 U.S. 398, 424 (1964); Goldsmith,  supra note 22, at 1621.  
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reasoning  in  foreign relations  cases, 60 an  approach  that highlights  the textual 
problems associated with common law in general and with the common law of 
foreign relations in particular. 
The scope of the federal common law of foreign relations has contracted in 
most areas over the past few decades, but immunity-related issues are an excep- 
tion.  The  immunity  of  foreign  sovereigns  is  governed  in  part  by  the  Foreign  
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).61 Most lower courts had held that the FSIA 
also applied to cases against individual foreign officials acting on behalf of their 
governments (although not to heads of state), 62  but in 2010, the Supreme Court 
held that the FSIA does not apply to any individual defendants and that their im-
munity is governed instead by “common law.” 63  The Court thus expanded the 
scope of federal common law governing immunity. 64 A series of lower court deci-
sions  have applied  the  common law  of  immunity  and  dismissed  cases  against 
sitting or former government officials based on either their status-based or con- 
duct-based immunity.65 
Closely related to immunity, courts also apply federal common law to deter-
mine whether foreign states should be liable for the actions of state-owned agen-
cies and instrumentalities, and vice-versa. The 1983 Supreme Court case on this  
topic, First National  City  Bank  v.  Banco  Para el  Comercio  Exterior  de  Cuba  
(Bancec), held that foreign governments and their separately constituted agencies 
and instrumentalities enjoy  a  presumption  that they  are legally distinct  for  the 
purposes of liability. 66 The Court applied federal common law—not Cuban law 
or state law—and noted the principles it applied are part of both common law and 
public international law. 67 Although  the  Court  was  not entirely clear  about 
whether  it  was applying federal  common law  or international law,  there  is  no 
60. Harlan Grant Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts Court , 83 GEO.  
WASH. L. REV. 380, 385–86 (2015). See generally Ingrid Wuerth, Medellı ´n: The New, New Formalism ?,  
13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1 (2009).  
61.  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602–  
1611 (2012).  
62.  See, e.g., Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2004); Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 277  
F.3d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 2002), abrogated by Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 1047 (2010); United  
States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997); Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 131–  
37 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).  
63.  Samantar, 560 U.S. at 325–26.  
64.  The Samantar Court said “common law,” but courts and commentators have interpreted that to 
mean federal, not state, common law.  Id.; see Wuerth, supra note 19, at 962.  
65.  See,  e.g.,  Lewis  v. Mutond,  258 F. Supp. 3d 168, 170  (D.D.C. 2017) (holding officials of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo “immune under the common law foreign official immunity doctrine”); 
Moriah  v.  Bank  of  China  Ltd.,  107  F.  Supp.  3d  272,  274  (S.D.N.Y.  2015)  (common law  foreign 
sovereign immunity precluded the deposition of a former Israeli official); Rishikof v. Mortada, 70 F. 
Supp. 3d 8, 10 (D.D.C. 2014) (conferring common law immunity on an employee of Switzerland who 
was acting within the scope of his employment). 
66.  First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 620–21 (1983)  
(Bancec).  
67.  Id.  at  623  (“[T]he principles  governing  this  case  are  common  to  both international law  and 
federal common law, which in these circumstances is necessarily informed both by international law 
principles and by articulated congressional policies.”).  
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plausible basis upon which to apply international law other than its arguable sta-
tus as some form of federal common law. The Court did say, however, that it 
refused to apply state or Cuban law because it wanted to avoid situations in which 
states could use their own corporate law to shield themselves  from liability to 
third parties for violations of international law. 68 Lower courts routinely apply  
the Bancec test,69 and have expanded it beyond federal common law governing 
corporate attribution for state-owned entities to also apply to the issues of immu-
nity that are governed by the FSIA and to constitutional issues. 70  Bancec is, how-
ever, rarely cited in academic discussions of federal common law. 71 
The common law act of state doctrine is also alive and well in the lower courts. 
Unlike immunity, which is a jurisdictional defense acting to prevent adjudication 
of the case, the act of state doctrine is (like most applications of the  Bancec test) a 
rule of decision, pursuant to which courts will not hold invalid the official act of a  
foreign sovereign in its own territory.72 Although the doctrine was narrowed in 
1990,  and  now applies only  if  deciding  the  case  requires holding  the  govern-
ment’s action invalid, 73 lower courts continue to apply it, and the Supreme Court 
recently mentioned it in the context of the recognition of foreign sovereigns. 74 
Courts apply federal common law doctrines governing acts of state, attribution 
of liability  among  state-owned  enterprises,  and  immunity,  but  their  basis  for  
doing so is somewhat unsteady. The Supreme Court has not provided a reason for 
applying federal common law in individual immunity cases, although it has sug-
gested that its reasons for doing so are historical. 75  Lower courts have occasion-
ally struggled to explain their power to apply federal common law under  Bancec, 
sometimes analyzing various sources of law to avoid holding that federal com-
mon law applies. 76 The act of state doctrine as part of federal common law dates  
68.  Id. at 622–23.  
69.  See, e.g., EM Ltd. v. Banco Cent. de La República Arg., 800 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2015); Alejandre v. 
Telefonica Larga Distancia de P.R., Inc., 183 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 1999).  
70.  See, e.g., Arch Trading Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, 839 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2016) (immunity); 
Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1078 (9th Cir. 2009); GSS Group Ltd. v. Nat’l Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805  
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (due process).  
71.  But  see Gary Born, Customary International Law in United States Courts , 92 WASH. L. REV.  
1641, 1706 (2017) (noting that Bancec applied federal common law rules derived from international law 
even though no statute required the application of federal common law and both state and foreign law  
addressed the issue). 
72.  W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990).  
73.  Id.; see, e.g., Hourani v. Mirtchev, 796 F.3d 1, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“The Act of State doctrine 
accordingly  did  not apply  [in  Kirkpatrick]  because  the  case could  be  decided  without directly 
adjudicating  the lawfulness  of  the  Nigerian  government’s  conduct.  Not  so  here.”); World  Wide 
Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhatan, 296 F.3d 1154, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Because the relief 
sought here would require us to question the ‘legality’ of Kazakhstan’s denial of the export license by 
ruling that denial a breach of contract, the act of state doctrine applies.”).  
74.  Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015).  
75.  See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 321–22 (2010).  
76.  See Compagnie Noga D’Importation et D’Exportation S.A. v. The Russian Federation, 361 F.3d 
676, 684–90 (2d Cir. 2004) (analyzing Russian law, federal common law, and international law);  id. at 
691–92 (Jacobs, C.J., concurring) (arguing for the application of federal common law and noting that “it 
is a more natural development of the analysis to identify the proper source of law and apply it”);  cf.  
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back to the 1964 Sabbatino case in which the Court reasoned that the doctrine 
had “constitutional  underpinnings”  and involved  issues  that  “must  be  treated 
exclusively as an aspect of federal law.” 77 It is unclear whether all Justices on the 
Supreme Court would agree with that reasoning today, especially Justices who 
are skeptical of federal common law or who emphasize the formal process for 
lawmaking under the Constitution. 78 In its most recent reference to the act of state  
doctrine,  the Court  mentioned neither  Sabbatino nor federal  common law,  but  
instead described the doctrine in terms of the deference courts afford the acts of  
foreign sovereigns committed within their own territory, perhaps reflecting uncer-
tainty about its basis in federal common law. 79 
Enter Bellia and Clark. They provide a different basis for applying both the 
individual  immunity  and  the  act  of  state  doctrines.  If  correct,  their  argument 
would constitutionalize both doctrines as part of the federal government’s power 
over recognition. Doing so would resolve formalist objections to the doctrines in 
their traditional common law form, but without concluding that state law must 
therefore apply, an  approach with potentially  broad appeal. Bellia  and Clark’s 
position is not persuasive, however. It involves creating an entirely new and im-
portant recognition-related constitutional power, one with no basis in the text of 
the Constitution and in tension with many of the Court’s leading decisions. It also 
mischaracterizes  the  task  of applying  and  interpreting  customary international 
law in immunity and act of state cases.  
II. AN UNRECOGNIZABLE RECOGNITION POWER 
The recognition power is a fundamental building block of Bellia and Clark’s 
effort to constitutionalize some parts of the federal common law of foreign rela-
tions. Key to their argument is this much-repeated claim: “[T]he Constitution’s 
Bettis  v. Islamic Republic  of  Iran,  315  F.3d  325,  330,  332–33  (D.C.  Cir.  2003)  (avoiding  the  term 
“federal common law” to describe the body of law applicable if a federal-question cause of action is 
implied from the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); EM Ltd. v. Banco Cent. de La Repu ´blica Arg.,  
800 F.3d 78, 90 (2d Cir. 2015) (referring to Bancec as a recognizing a “statutory presumption”). 
77.  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423–25 (1964).  
78.  See Medellı́n  v.  Texas,  552  U.S.  491,  530–32  (2008)  (discussing  and ultimately declining  to  
extend Garamendi); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 739 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (“Although I agree with much in Part IV, I cannot join it because the 
judicial lawmaking role it invites would commit the Federal Judiciary to a task it is neither authorized 
nor  suited  to  perform.”); Boyle  v.  United  Techs.  Corp.,  487  U.S.  500,  514  (1988)  (Brennan,  J., 
dissenting) (“The Court—unelected and unaccountable to the people—has unabashedly stepped into the 
breach to legislate a rule denying Lt. Boyle’s family the compensation that state law assures them. This  
time the injustice is of this Court’s own making.”).  
79.  See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2084 (“The actions of a recognized sovereign committed within its 
own territory also receive deference in domestic courts under the act of state doctrine.”); see also  W.S. 
Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 404–05 (1990) (describing act of state 
doctrine in detail without mentioning common law). Even the majority opinion in  Sosa evinces a certain 
discomfort with the act of state doctrine as federal common law, reasoning that: “And although we have 
even  assumed  competence  to  make judicial rules  of  decision  of particular  importance  to  foreign 
relations, such as the act of state doctrine the general practice has been to look for legislative guidance 
before exercising innovative authority over substantive law.”  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726 (citation omitted); 
see also  Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1402 (2018).  
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exclusive allocation of the recognition power to the political branches required 
courts  and  states  to uphold  the traditional  rights  of  recognized  foreign  nations 
under the law of state-state relations.” 80 Their recognition power is exclusive to 
the political branches—meaning that it excludes both courts and the states from 
recognizing foreign states and also that it requires courts and states “to respect  
the  rights  that  accompanied  that  status.”81 Denial  by  courts  or  states  of  those 
“rights” that accompany the status as a recognized state would “contradict” and 
“usurp” the political branches’ exercise of the recognition power. 82  The “rights” 
that are traditionally part of the exclusive recognition power include immunity 
and territorial integrity; the latter gives rise to the act of state doctrine. 83  
Recognition is at the core of their argument, but the authors do not provide a 
comprehensive analysis  of its constitutional basis  nor  of its relationship to the 
“rights” that purportedly accompany it, such as immunity and the act of state doc- 
trine.84 Recognition,  as  the  Supreme  Court recently explained,  is  a “‘formal 
acknowledgement’ that a particular ‘entity possesses the qualifications for state-
hood’ or ‘that a particular regime is the effective government of a state.’” 85  As a 
matter of the Constitution’s text, the argument that a broad and exclusive recogni-
tion power—one that includes rights that follow from recognition—is vested in 
the political branches is not especially convincing. 86 It involves a series of infer-
ences. Recognition itself is not an explicit constitutional power at all; instead, it is 
a  power implied  in  part  from  the  President’s  power  to  receive  ambassadors. 87 
From the implied power to recognize a foreign state, Bellia and Clark infer that 
recognition includes a set of additional powers, those which relate to sovereign 
rights and which may follow from the act of recognition, such as the act of state  
doctrine and immunity.88 And by further implication, neither the states nor courts 
(state or federal) may interfere with the rights which follow from recognition. 89  
The second and third steps of the argument are unconvincing. In effect, they 
create a new constitutional category: the rights that sometimes follow from recog-
nition. The legal rights which may follow from recognition—immunity and act 
of  state—are  not  part  of  the  recognition  power itself,  contrary  to Bellia  and 
Clark’s position. The Supreme Court recently noted that “[l]egal consequences 
follow formal recognition,” including the rights of recognized sovereigns to sue  
in United States courts, sovereign immunity, and “deference in domestic courts  
80.  BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 41; see id. at 15–16, 43, 269–71.  
81.  Id. at 53.  
82.  Id. at 43, 53, 57, 170–71, 269–70.  
83.  Id. at 99–100.  
84.  See id. at 15–16, 51–56.  
85.  Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN  
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 203 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1986)).  
86.  See Ramsey, supra note 13, at 1790–91.  
87.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2085; see BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 15;  
Robert J. Reinstein, Recognition: A Case Study on the Original Understanding of Executive Power , 45  
U. RICH. L. REV. 801, 812–16 (2011).  
88.  See BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 90, 98, 175.  
89.  Id. at 56.  
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under the act of state doctrine,” but the Court never suggested that these conse-
quences were part of recognition itself as a constitutional matter. 90 Indeed, those 
doctrines have a distinct constitutional basis, one that is not exclusive to the fed-
eral political branches, as demonstrated both by recent cases discussed in Part A 
and by mid-twentieth century cases related to the recognition of the Soviet Union  
discussed in Part B.  
A. RECOGNITION AND ZIVOTOFKSY V. KERRY 
Contemporary case law does not support a broad recognition power exclusive 
to the political branches. The Supreme Court’s recent blockbuster case on recog- 
nition, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, held that recognition is exclusive to the President. 91 
The  case  is  mentioned only occasionally  by Bellia  and Clark,  who downplay  
Zivotofsky’s significance by saying that whether the recognition power is exclu-
sive to the President “is not of central importance here.” 92  The important point, 
rather, is that the Constitution gave exclusive power to the federal government, 
not the courts or the states, meaning that “both courts and states” are precluded 
from  “taking  it  upon themselves  to  exercise  or  countermand  the  recognition 
power of the federal government.” 93  
The Zivotofksy case is problematic for Bellia and Clark’s thesis, however. It  
drives a wedge between the recognition power and the “rights” which flow from 
recognition. Bellia and Clark argue that those rights are themselves an aspect of 
the constitutional  power  over  recognition.  Over  and  over, Bellia  and Clark 
describe the obligation of courts and states to respect foreign nations as following 
directly from recognition itself, which is constitutionally vested in the “political  
branches.”94 The point is central to their claim that courts and states are required 
to respect those rights, to their claim that cases about those rights arise under the 
Constitution itself, and to their claim that federal courts applying law related to 
those rights do not violate the Supremacy Clause.  
But Zivotofsky holds that recognition is vested in the President alone. 95  As a 
result,  the legal  effects  of  recognition  are  not  an  aspect  of  recognition itself  
because those rights are not exclusive to the President. Unlike recognition itself, 
power over the legal effects of recognition (for example, act of state and immu- 
nity) is shared between Congress and the President.96 Congress has, for example, 
controlled  the  rights  of  recognized  states  by  enacting legislation  that directly   
90.  See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2084.  
91.  Id. at 2094.  
92.  BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 56.  
93.  Id.  
94.  See, e.g., id. at xxvi–vii, 83–89, 104, 112, 169–71, 218–19, 225, 253–55, 268, 269–70.  
95.  135 S. Ct. at 2094. 
96.  As Bellia and Clark point out, their argument “does not rest on the general observation that the 
Constitution assigns various foreign relations powers to the federal government”; instead, it “derives 
from  the  precise language employed  by Articles  I  and  II  to  grant  specific  powers  to  the political  
branches.” BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 16.  
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regulates immunity and the act of state doctrine. 97 
The Supreme Court examined the source of federal congressional power over for- 
eign sovereign immunity in Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria  without even  
mentioning recognition,98  reasoning instead that the power is based on Congress’s 
authority  “over  foreign  commerce  and  foreign relations.” 99 Congressional  power 
over the act of state doctrine is apparently not based on the recognition power either,  
but  instead  from  the  power  over  foreign  commerce.100 Not only  is constitutional  
power over the act of state and immunity doctrines not the same as the recognition 
power, it is also not exclusive to the federal political branches. The power over the 
act of state and immunity doctrines comes at least in part from the authority to regu-
late commerce with foreign nations, which is not exclusive to the political branches 
or  even  to  the federal  government.  The  Foreign  Commerce Clause  permits 
Congress to displace state law on matters affecting interstate commerce, but it is not 
exclusive. States are free to legislate on issues related to foreign commerce unless 
Congress chooses to act to preempt state law. 101 If recognition is exclusive to the  
President as Zivotofsky held, and if the act of state doctrine and immunity are part 
and parcel of the recognition power as Bellia and Clark maintain, then it follows 
that presidential power over those doctrines is also exclusive, and the federal statutes 
regulating  the  act  of  state  doctrine  and  foreign  state  immunity  are  therefore all 
unconstitutional. 
The wedge between recognition and the legal rights of sovereigns that follow 
in part from recognition is fatal to Bellia and Clark’s argument about exclusivity, 
at least  as  they  present  it.  The  Court  reasoned  in  Zivotofsky  that,  “As  Justice  
Jackson wrote in Youngstown, when a Presidential power is ‘exclusive,’ it ‘disabl  
[es]  the  Congress  from  acting  upon  the  subject.’”102 Bellia  and Clark  have  a 
97.  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611 (2012) (regulating 
foreign immunity); Second Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (1964) (regulating the act of  
state doctrine).  
98.  461 U.S. 480 (1983).  
99.  Id. at 493. The Court went on to note that when enacting the FSIA, Congress relied on: 
its powers to prescribe the jurisdiction of federal courts, Art. I, § 8, cl. 9; to define offenses against 
the ‘Law of Nations,’ Art. I, § 8, cl. 10; to regulate commerce with foreign nations, Art. I, § 8, cl. 
3; and to make all laws necessary and proper to execute the Government’s powers, Art. I, § 8, cl.  
18.   
Id. at 493 n.19.  
100.  See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957, 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),  aff’d, 383 F.2d  
166 (2d Cir. 1967).  
101.  See Ryan Baasch & Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash,  Congress and the Reconstruction of Foreign 
Affairs Federalism , 115 MICH. L. REV. 47, 65 (2016) (“[T]he grant of commerce authority to Congress 
does not necessarily bar state regulation of the same commerce.”). See generally  MICHAEL J. GLENNON  
& ROBERT D. SLOANE, FOREIGN  AFFAIRS  FEDERALISM: THE  MYTH  OF  NATIONAL  EXCLUSIVITY 147–83 
(2016) (describing the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause).  But cf. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los 
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451–54 (1979) (holding that a California ad valorem tax violated the dormant 
Foreign Commerce Clause if the tax was applied to Japanese cargo containers registered in Japan and 
used exclusively in foreign commerce).  
102.  Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2095 (2015) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.  
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).  
1840  THE  GEORGETOWN  LAW  JOURNAL [Vol. 106:1825 
broader conception of exclusivity. They argue that the “political branches” have 
exclusive power over rights that flow from recognition, which disables both states 
and federal courts from acting on those rights. 103  As we have seen, however, the 
rights that flow from recognition do not follow directly from recognition, nor are 
they exclusive to the federal government. Bellia and Clark base key parts of their 
argument on federal exclusivity, including the claim that states are constitution-
ally required to respect the rights of recognized nations and that courts can apply 
those rights as preemptive federal law without violating the Supremacy Clause 
because the Constitution itself is doing the preempting of state law. 104  
B. RECOGNITION OF THE SOVIET UNION 
The  primary  cases  upon  which Bellia  and Clark rely also  do  not  support  a 
broad  and exclusive rights-related-to-recognition  power  vested  in  the political  
branches.105  In United States v. Pink, the Court considered the effect of Soviet 
decrees that nationalized Russian insurance companies and their property, wher-
ever located. 106 The United States subsequently concluded an executive agree-
ment  with  the  Soviet  government  and simultaneously  recognized  it  as  the  
government of Russia.107 The agreement included an assignment (the Litvinov 
Assignment) that gave to the United States the claims of the Soviet government 
against American nationals. 108 The United States brought an action to recover the 
property of a Russian insurance company which was still in the possession of the  
New York Superintendent of Insurance.109 New York law did not give extraterri-
torial effect to the 1918 decree, and the New York courts held for the defend- 
ant.110 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that New York law was preempted, 
despite the lack of a federal statute or Article II treaty. 111 What was doing the pre-
empting?  The  opinion  gives  two possible  responses:  the  executive  agreement  
between the United States and the Soviet Union, or the President’s recognition of  
the Soviet Union.112 Subsequent cases and commentators have relied upon the  
first,113 while Bellia and Clark focus on the second.  
103.  BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 269.  
104.  See  id.  at  xxi  (stating  that  “the  Constitution’s exclusive allocation  of powers  to  the political 
branches  to  recognize  foreign  nations  .  .  .  require[s]  courts  and  U.S.  states  to uphold  the  rights  of 
recognized foreign nations under the law of state-state relations”); see also id . at xxvi–xxvii, 50, 71, 166,  
171–73, 197–98, 230, 250–55.  
105.  See id. at 98–101, 104, 173–75, 180. These cases are Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino , 376  
U.S. 398 (1964), United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), and United States v. Belmont , 301 U.S. 324  
(1937).  
106.  315 U.S. at 210–11.  
107.  Id. at 211.  
108.  Id. at 211–13 (quoting the Litvinov Assignment).  
109.  Id. at 213.  
110.  Id. at 215, 217.  
111.  Id. at 233–34 (holding that the property right had previously vested in the Soviet Government  
and passed to the the United States under the Litvinov Assignment).  
112.  315 U.S. at 231–32.  
113.  See infra notes 127–29 and accompanying text.  
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Some language in  Pink and a similar case, United States v. Belmont ,114 appears  
on its face to support a broad, preemptive recognition power.115  The Court rea- 
soned  in  Pink,  for example,  that  the  President’s  authority  “is  not limited  to  a 
determination of the government to be recognized. It includes the power to deter-
mine the policy which is to govern the question of recognition.” 116 But commen-
tators immediately recognized that  Pink’s language about recognition proved too 
much. They noted that the courts of no other country would give a confiscating 
government such as the Soviet Union title to property in the forum state, even af-
ter recognition, without regard to whether not doing so violated domestic policy 
or international law, 117 and that giving recognition the legal effect suggested by 
some of the language in  Pink would require that “the United States undertake a 
one-sided commitment, without regard for possible unfair treatment of the par-
ties,  to  effectuate  the  most  diverse legislation  of  foreign  nations.” 118  In  other 
words,  as  in  the  immunity  cases  discussed  in  the  next  section,  the legal rule 
applied in  Pink that preempted state law did not follow directly from recognition. 
Other countries did not give nationalization decrees of recognized governments’ 
extraterritorial effect, 119 nor did courts in the United States in the years before or  
after Pink.120 It was the sole executive agreement that gave effect to decree, not 
recognition itself. 
Bellia and Clark suggest in passing that the confiscation of New York prop- 
erty in Belmont was not extraterritorial because the corporation that owned the  
property was Russian.121 State courts were thus obligated to honor the Russian 
nationalization decrees under the act of state doctrine after the United States  
114.  301 U.S. 324 (1937).  
115.  See BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 98–101.  
116.  315 U.S. at 229; see Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2088 (2015) (quoting Pink, 315 U.S.  
at 229).  
117.  See Note, Effect of Soviet Recognition upon Russian Confiscatory Decrees, 51 YALE L.J. 848,  
851  (1942); see also  John  R.  Stevenson, Effect  of  Recognition  on  the Application  of  Private 
International Law Norms , 51 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 720 (1951) (“Hitherto the efficacy of a recognized  
foreign  government’s  acts  intended  to  affect  persons  or  property  within  the  United  States  had  been 
considered open to challenge in American courts. There had been scarcely a hint in the cases, and none  
whatsoever by the commentators, of the converse doctrine that mere recognition, without more, might 
impose  on  the  courts  an  affirmative  duty  to  give extraterritorial  effect  to  the legislative  acts  of  the 
recognized government even where violative of international law or repugnant to the public policy of  
the forum.”).  
118.  Stevenson, supra note 117, at 721.  
119.  See F.A. Mann, Case Note, Extraterritorial Effect of Confiscatory Legislation , 5 MOD. L. REV. 
161, 262 (1942) (“It is probably no exaggeration to say that the principle that confiscatory legislation is  
denied any effect upon property situate[d] outside the boundaries of the confiscating state, has hitherto 
been  regarded  as  one  of  the  most securely established  and  most commonly  accepted  maxims  of 
international law . . . .”).  
120.  See, e.g., Vladikavkazsky Ry. Co. v. N.Y. Tr. Co., 189 N.E. 456, 461 (N.Y. 1934); Stevenson,  
supra note  117,  at  723  (“[C]ourts  have  deemed themselves  free  to  deny  effect  within  New  York  to 
foreign decrees regarded as repugnant to the public policy of the state, even where such decrees emanate  
from recognized foreign governments.”).  
121.  BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 99, 100 n.91, 173; see also Bradford R. Clark,  Domesticating 
Sole  Executive  Agreements ,  93  VA.  L.  REV.  1573,  1643  (2007)  (“[T]he  Court  seemed  to apply  the  
doctrine based on the situs of the Russian corporation (Russia).”).  
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recognized the Soviet government.122  But the Supreme Court did not take a  
position on the situs of the confiscation in Belmont.123 Although the decision 
does discuss several act of state cases—all of which however involved confis-
cation of property located in the territory of the confiscating foreign state—it 
does so in support of its conclusion that “no state policy can prevail against the 
international compact here,” meaning the executive agreement assigning the 
claims.124 The Court explains that the act of state doctrine preempts state law, 
and so, too, do the international agreements concluded by the President as part  
of the decision to recognize the Soviet Union.125  The Pink case, too, does not 
conclude that the situs of the confiscations was Russia. 126  
Subsequent  Supreme  Court  cases  have  not  interpreted Belmont  and  Pink 
as Bellia and Clark do. The Court has reasoned instead that the constitutional ba-
sis  for  those  decisions  is  the sole  executive  agreement concluded  between 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union,  not  recognition.  In particular,  the  
Supreme Court’s decision in Dames & Moore v. Regan gave preemptive force to 
a sole executive agreement not concluded in connection with recognition, relying 
in part on the precedent established in  Pink.127 The Court similarly relied exten-
sively on Belmont and Pink in American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, which 
gave  preemptive  effect  to  the  President’s policy related  to  the settlement  of 
claims  by  executive  agreement. 128  As  the  Court  has  described  it,  these  cases 
appear  to establish  a  narrow presidential  power  to settle claims  with  foreign  
sovereigns  through  non-treaty  agreements.129  The Belmont  and  Pink  cases  fit   
122.  BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 99. They say, for example, that in Belmont: “The Supreme Court 
found  it ‘irrelevant’  that  the  Russian  corporation’s  property  was located  in  New  York  at  the  time  of 
confiscation because the confiscation of the corporation took place in Russia.”  Id. at 173. But they misstate 
how  the  opinion  uses  the  word “irrelevant.”  The  opinion  says  instead  that  “when judicial  authority  is 
invoked” in aid of the federal government’s consummation of its authority over “international negotiations 
and  compacts,  and  in  respect  of our foreign relations generally,” then “state  constitutions, state laws, and 
state policies are irrelevant to the inquiry and decision.” United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331–32 
(1937). The book makes a similar mistake in this sentence describing Belmont: “In the Court’s view, no state 
power ‘can be interposed as an obstacle to the effective operation of a federal constitutional power’—in this  
case, the recognition power.” BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 99–100 (citing Belmont, 301 U.S. at 332).  
But the  case was not referring to the recognition power. Instead,  the Court cites  to cases about the treaty 
power  because  the “federal constitutional  power”  under  discussion  in  the language  quoted  by Bellia  and 
Clark  is  not the  recognition  power but  instead  the  power over  “foreign relations generally” and  over “all 
international negotiations and compacts.” Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331–32. 
123.  New York courts held that New York was the situs of expropriation. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 327.  
124.  Id.  
125.  Id. at 328–30.  
126.  United  States  v.  Pink,  315  U.S.  203,  221,  234  (1942); see also Animal  Sci.  Prod.,  Inc.  v.  Hebei 
Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1864 (2018) (The disposition of [ United States v. Pink] turned on the 
extraterritorial  effect  of  the nationalization decree—specifically,  whether  the  decree  reached  assets  of  the 
Russian insurance company located in the United States, or was instead limited to property in Russia”).  
127.  453 U.S. 654, 682–83 (1981).  
128.  539 U.S. 396, 415–17 (2003).  
129.  See Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 530–31 (2007) (“The claims-settlement cases [including 
Belmont] involve  a  narrow  set  of  circumstances:  the  making  of  executive  agreements  to settle 
civil claims between American citizens and foreign governments or foreign nationals.”).  
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comfortably within such a power, 130  but that reading of the cases is inconsistent 
with how they are described by Bellia and Clark. 
The sole-executive  agreement rationale  of Belmont  and  Pink,  and  the  cases 
that rely upon and expand that rationale, are unsatisfactory in their own ways. In 
those cases, the President is able to make law which controls the outcome of cases 
in federal courts, and which preempts inconsistent state law, in tension with, or 
directly contrary to, the Supremacy Clause and basic separation of powers princi-
ples.131 Bellia and Clark avoid these difficulties by grounding these decisions in  
the recognition power, rather than in the President’s power to make preemptive  
non-treaty  agreements.  In  that  sense  their  theory  is  attractive.  But  they  do  so 
by distorting and expanding the recognition power. Recognition lacks the self- 
executing effects that Bellia and Clark attribute to it. In Belmont and Pink, the act  
of recognizing the Soviet Union did not have the obvious or direct consequence 
of  giving legal  effect  to nationalization  decrees  which  acted extraterritorially  
upon property in the United States. Indeed, as noted above, other countries did 
not give recognition such a broad effect, and neither apparently did the U.S. gov- 
ernment in other situations.132 The legal effect of the nationalization decrees did 
not follow from recognition itself, as Bellia and Clark argue, but instead involved 
an intermediate act, which itself had legal effect: the sole-executive agreement. 
The same problem arises in the context of sovereign immunity. Immunity does 
not follow directly from recognition, both as a matter of the scope of the recogni- 
tion power, as described above,133 and as a matter of how immunity decisions are 
actually made, as described in the next section. 
The failure to distinguish between recognition and the legal effects of recogni-
tion is a significant problem for Bellia and Clark’s thesis. It is also a distinction 
highlighted in a Supreme Court decision that they do not discuss:  Guaranty Trust  
Co. v. United States.134 In that case, too, the United States sought to recover assets  
granted  to  it  under  the  Litvinov  Assignment.135  The  defendant  argued  that  the 
claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The United States argued that the 
limitations period was tolled during the period that the United States did not rec- 
ognize  the  Soviet  Union.136 Although  the  United  States  had  recognized  the 
Provisional Government of Russia (which could have sued, meaning that the lim-
itations period should not have tolled), the subsequent recognition of the Soviet  
130.  See id.  
131.  See Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association v. Garamendi  
and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 913 (2004) (arguing that 
the “inclusion  of  treaties  in  the  Supremacy Clause”  “stands squarely  against  the  idea  of  executive 
lawmaking in foreign affairs”); Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The Dangers of Deference: International Claim 
Settlement by the President , 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 11 (2003) (“Termination of domestic litigation by 
the courts in deference to a sole executive agreement stands in significant tension with the Supremacy 
and Treaty Clauses of the Constitution.”).  
132.  See Stevenson, supra note 117, at 725.  
133.  See supra notes 91–104 and accompanying text.  
134.  304 U.S. 126 (1938).  
135.  Id. at 130.  
136.  Id. at 130–31.  
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government “operates to set at naught all the legal consequences of the prior rec-
ognition by the United States of the Provisional Government.” 137  That was, at 
least, the U.S. government’s argument. But the Court rejected it, reasoning that  
the government’s “action in recognizing a foreign government and in receiving 
its diplomatic  representatives  is conclusive  on all  domestic  courts,  which  are 
bound to accept that determination, although they are free to draw for themselves 
its legal  consequences  in litigations  pending  before  them.” 138 The  Court also 
noted that although those “legal consequences” could not be altered through the 
power over recognition, they might be altered through an executive agreement. 139  
III. COURTS AND THE RIGHTS THAT MAY FOLLOW FROM RECOGNITION 
When courts apply international and other law related to the rights of foreign 
sovereigns, are they merely implementing the Constitution itself? As Bellia and 
Clark describe it, the Constitution “requires courts and states to uphold the rights 
of recognized foreign sovereigns under the law of state-state relations.” 140 Courts 
are required to enforce the rights of recognized states and governments “unless 
and until  the political  branches unequivocally  abrogate”  them. 141  In  doing  so, 
courts do not make law but instead are merely respecting a decision made by the 
political branches. 142 Indeed, the power over the rights related to recognition is 
exclusive to the President and Congress; thus, the courts are constitutionally pre-
cluded  from  decisionmaking  over  the  rights related  to  recognition,  except  to 
“enforce” or “uphold” them. 143 
Bellia and Clark’s description of the courts’ role is inconsistent with what courts 
actually do when they rule on common law immunity and act of state issues. Their 
description  is also  inconsistent  with  the  Supreme  Court’s  description  of  what 
courts do and with the nature of customary international law itself. As decribed 
below, courts are sometimes involved in a law-making and law-developing enter-
prise. To apply customary international law is itself to make and reinforce custom-
ary international law, although  the  space  to  do  so  is  today limited  by federal 
statute. Bellia and Clark might respond that these points do not undermine their 
thesis: courts should apply customary international law as best they can, even if its  
content is uncertain. As a descriptive matter, however, there is tension between 
what Bellia and Clark  say courts do – enforcing and upholding existing law – and  
what courts actually do which is sometimes  making and developing law. What 
courts actually do, especially historically, is descriptively closer to federal com-
mon law-making  than  it  is  to  the implementation  of political  branch  decision-  
making.  
137.  Id. at 140. 
 
138.  Id. at 138. 
 
139.  Id. at 142. 
 
140.  BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 253. 
 
141.  Id. at 255 (using this language in the context of head of state immunity). 
 
142.  See id. at 271. 
 
143.  See id. at 271–72. 
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The act of state doctrine does not, for example, follow as the enforcement or 
application  of  customary international law.  Most recently,  the  Supreme  Court 
described the doctrine as one of judicial deference without mentioning customary 
international law. 144  Before  that,  the  Court  in  Kirkpatrick,  a  case barely  men-
tioned by Bellia and Clark, described the doctrine as requiring that “the acts of 
foreign sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions . . . be deemed valid.” The 
Court not only eschewed the common law-like reasoning of  Sabbatino, but it also 
made clear that the doctrine did not have its basis in international law and it said  
nothing about recognition.145 And in Sabbatino, the Court said that the act of state 
doctrine is “compelled by neither international law nor the Constitution,” 146 con-
trary to Bellia and Clark’s argument that the act of state doctrine is compelled by  
both international law and the Constitution. 147 Bellia and Clark reason that courts 
must continue to apply the old act of state doctrine, which was once compelled 
by international law, until the political branches direct otherwise. 148 They do lit-
tle, however, to show that the act of state doctrine was ever a constraint imposed 
by international law, as opposed to a matter of comity that one state afforded to  
another.149 
Immunity determinations also do not follow directly from recognition. Instead, 
courts actively developed the law itself. Legal historian G. Edward White writes  
that:  
[N]ineteenth-century foreign sovereign immunity decisions took as a given that 
courts could  make  independent  determinations  on  whether  a  foreign  sovereign 
was  immune  from  suit  in  a particular  set  of  circumstances,  even  though  they 
regarded themselves as bound by executive branch determinations of the existence 
of  sovereign  status. Judicial resolutions  of  foreign  sovereign  immunity  issues 
were made on the basis of customary international law, which was treated as part 
of common law. 150 
White’s description contradicts is in tension with Bellia and Clark’s view in 
multiple ways. Contrary to their position, White’s description shows that courts  
made  their  own  decisions  about  immunity,151 developing  the law  as  they  did   
144.  See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015). 
145.  W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990). 
146.  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964).  
147.  BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 104–06.  
148.  Id.  
149.  See, e.g., Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303–04 (1918); see also William S. Dodge, 
Customary International Law, Change, and the Constitution , 106 GEO. L.J. 1559 (2018).  
150.  G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations , 85  
VA. L. REV. 1, 134 (1999).  
151.  See THEODORE R. GIUTTARI, THE  AMERICAN  LAW  OF  SOVEREIGN  IMMUNITY: AN  ANALYSIS  OF  
LEGAL  INTERPRETATION  42  (1970)  (noting  that  immunity  cases  in  the  nineteenth  century  were  not 
especially significant but also stating that “courts in this period expressed hardly any doubts about their 
competence to hear and determine controversies involving questions of sovereign immunity through the 
application of the rules and authorities they considered pertinent to the issues of law”).  
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so,152 and that courts were only bound by a decision concerning the existence of  
sovereign status (not about the rights accompanying that status). Another histori-
cal treatment of the period observes that courts often did not distinguish between 
the immunity of foreign states and the immunity of local governments, 153 a point 
that undermines the claim that immunity follows directly from the recognition of 
a foreign state as a function of customary international law. 
During the early and mid-twentieth century, the judicial approach to immunity  
described above began to change. Courts gave the executive branch increasing  
authority to make determinations  about the immunity of foreign  sovereigns.154 
The trend culminated in the 1945 decision Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman , an ad-
miralty  case involving  the  immunity  of  Mexico. 155  The  issue  in  Hoffman  was 
whether a vessel owned by a foreign sovereign but operated by a private party for 
commercial purposes was entitled to immunity. 156  The Court reasoned that it is  
“not for the courts to deny an immunity which our government has seen fit to 
allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the government has not  
seen fit to recognize.”157 The Court justified its deference to the executive branch 
as arising out of a concern that the denial of immunity and resulting seizure of  
property “may be regarded as such an affront to its dignity and may so affect our 
relations with it, that it is an accepted rule of substantive law governing the exer-
cise  of the jurisdiction  of the courts that they  accept  and follow  the executive 
determination that the vessel shall be treated as immune.” 158   
Note that the Court’s justification for deferring to the executive branch is iden-
tical to the reasons it gave for developing federal common law of foreign rela- 
tions in Sabbatino: a concern about the deleterious effect of judicial decisions on  
152.  Even during the period of absolute immunity, state and federal courts resolved many questions of 
law related to immunity, and in doing so, they contributed to the development of state and international 
law governing immunity.  See, e.g., Mason v. Intercolonial Ry. of Can., 83 N.E. 876, 877 (Mass. 1908) 
(discussing  whether  state  agencies  are entitled  to  immunity  as  foreign  sovereigns);  Hassard  v.  United 
States of Mexico, 29 Misc. 511, 512 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1899) (discussing whether immunity applies in cases 
against foreign sovereigns and the agents who represent them, as well as against their property); Manning  
v. State of Nicaragua, 14 How. Pr. 517, 518 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857) (discussing whether a foreign state may 
be named as a defendant in an action at all). Furthermore, as foreign states became more economically 
active and powerful at the beginning of the twentieth century, courts were called upon to resolve many 
new  issues related  to  the  immunity  of  foreign  sovereigns  when  engaged  in commercial  conduct.  See 
generally GIUTTARI, supra note 151.  
153.  GIUTTARI, supra note 151, at 38 (“The failure of American courts to distinguish sharply in this 
period  between  the  immunities  of local  and  foreign  sovereigns led  them  to  cite  authorities  and 
precedents involving the exempt status of each interchangeably.”);  see, e.g., The Johnson Lighterage  
Co. No. 24, 231 F. 365, 368 (D.N.J. 1916).  
154.  White, supra note 150, at 134–45.  
155.  324 U.S. 30 (1945).  
156.  Id. at 31.  
157.  Id. at 35; see also Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943) (“More specifically, the 
judicial seizure of the vessel of a friendly foreign state is so serious a challenge to its dignity, and may so 
affect  our friendly relations  with  it,  that  courts  are  required  to  accept  and follow  the  executive 
determination that the vessel is immune.”).   
158.  Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35–36.  
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foreign policy. 159  The outcome was different: in Sabbatino, the Court kept law-
making in the federal courts rather than permitting state law incursions, 160 and in  
Hoffman, the Court attempted to transfer some decisionmaking authority to the  
executive branch.161 But the Hoffman decision was not based on any sort of analy-
sis of the President’s constitutional powers; instead, it was based on the Court’s 
independent analysis of the potential foreign policy implications of all immunity 
decisions. In the end, the Court’s institutional competence reasoning was wrong: 
executive control over  immunity created  more  foreign policy problems than  it 
solved, leading eventually to a statutory enactment. 162 
The transformation of the law of immunity in the 1930s and 1940s does not 
support Bellia and Clark’s position any more than the nineteenth century im-
munity  practices  do.  In  this context,  too, immunity did not follow directly 
from the act of recognition. Instead, there were myriad intermediate, detailed, 
and often dispositive issues about the content of immunity law itself and the 
procedures that govern it. Even if immunity is a legal consequence that may 
follow from recognition, it is nevertheless the subject of a distinct body of 
law.163 In the years following  Hoffman, that body of law was made by courts 
in  the  United  States  through  a  combination  of judicial  and  executive 
lawmaking. 
Had immunity followed as a straightforward application of recognition, there 
would have been no need for the 1952 “Tate Letter,” entitled “Changed Policy  
Concerning  the  Granting  of  Sovereign  Immunity  to  Foreign  Governments.”164 
The letter announced the adoption of the restrictive approach to immunity, a posi-
tion that the government had already adopted in many contexts. 165 The restrictive 
approach is fundamental to the law of immunity; adopting it followed not from 
recognition, but instead from a lawmaking process shared between the courts and 
the executive branch. In explaining its desired effect on the courts, the Tate Letter 
said that although “a shift in policy by the executive cannot control the courts . . . 
it is felt that the courts are less likely to allow a plea of sovereign immunity where  
159.  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964).  
160.  See  id.  at  427 (concluding  that  “the  scope  of  the  act  of  state  doctrine  must  be  determined 
according to federal law”).  
161.  Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 38.  
162.  Wuerth, supra note 19, at 924. 
163. Several courts have even provided immunity to entities not recognized by the political branches.  
See, e.g., Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 138 N.E. 24, 25–26 (N.Y. 1923) 
(holding immune the Russian Federated Soviet Republic, which was the de facto government of Russia, 
but which had not been recognized by the United States); Telkes v. Hungarian Nat’l Museum, 38 N.Y. 
S.2d 419, 423 (N.Y. App. Div. 1942) (“[T]he rule forbidding suit against a foreign sovereign without his 
consent does not rest on comity, but is applied because such suits involve claims of a political nature 
which are not entrusted to the municipal courts. Based on the reasoning that the immunity from suit is 
not  a  matter  of  comity,  our  courts hold  that lack  of diplomatic  recognition  does  not  affect  the  
immunity.”). 
164.  Letter from Jack B. Tate to Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter],  in 26  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 984 (1952).  
165.  See GIUTTARI, supra note 151, at 188–89.  
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the executive has declined to do so.” 166 
The law  of  foreign  sovereign  immunity  underwent  another  transformation  
when  Congress  passed  the  FSIA  in  1976.167 The  FSIA included detailed rules 
governing claims and the enforcement of judgments against  foreign  states and 
their agencies and instrumentalities. 168 It aimed to resolve many issues that had 
long  been  uncertain  under  both international law  and  the law  of  the  United  
States.169 It was also intended to end the practice of deferring to the executive  
branch decisions on immunity.170 
The FSIA does not address all aspects of immunity related to foreign sover-
eigns. In particular, it does not apply in cases against individuals 171 and it likely 
does not apply in criminal cases. 172 Common law thus governs when an individ-
ual who is sued may be entitled to immunity based on her status, for example as a 
head of state, or based on her conduct, for example official conduct on behalf of a  
foreign state.173 Bellia and Clark argue that status and conduct-based immunities 
are  part  of  the “political  branches’ constitutional  power  to  recognize  foreign  
states, governments, and heads of state.”174 
Bellia and Clark’s argument works best for head-of-state immunity, which, at 
its core, is uncontested under international law. After the president recognizes a 
country, its head of state is entitled to immunity in U.S. domestic courts, a process 
consistent with how Bellia and Clark depict the law governing immunity. 175 Even 
here, however, there are wrinkles that must be resolved through legal norms that  
166.  Tate Letter, supra note 164, at 985. The Tate Letter is part of a broader trend in international and 
domestic law  away  from “absolute  immunity”  in  favor  of  a  “restrictive  approach”  which  denied 
immunity  for  private  or commercial  conduct  by  foreign  sovereigns.  See  HAZEL  FOX  CMG  QC  &  
PHILIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 147–48 (3d ed. 2013).  
167.  Foreign  Sovereign  Immunities  Act  of  1976,  Pub.  L.  No.  94-583,  90  Stat.  2891  (codified  as  
amended in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611 (2012)).  
168.  Id.  
169.  See  RESTATEMENT  (FOURTH)  OF  THE  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  LAW  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES:  
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY intro. note (AM. LAW INST. Tentative Draft No. 3, 2017).  
170.  See Wuerth, supra note 19, at 940–41; see also Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461  
U.S. 480, 488 (1983) (stating the FSIA was passed “in order to free the Government from the case-by- 
case diplomatic pressures”).  
171.  Samantar  v.  Yousuf,  560  U.S.  305,  311–13,  320–21  (2010)  (describing  foreign  sovereign 
immunity  as  governed  by  “common law”  before  FSIA’s  enactment,  and  the  immunity  of individual 
government officials as governed by “common law” after FSIA’s enactment).  
172.  See  RESTATEMENT  (FOURTH)  OF  THE  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  LAW  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES:  
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY § 451, reporters’ note 4 (AM. LAW INST., forthcoming 2018) (on file with author).  
173.  Samantar, 560 U.S. at 311–13, 320–21; see Wuerth, supra note 19, at 917–18. See generally  
Chimène  I.  Keitner, The  Common  Law  of  Foreign Official  Immunity ,  14  GREEN  BAG  2d  61,  65–66  
(2010).  
174.  BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 198. 
175.  Lewis S. Yelin, Head of State Immunity as Sole Executive Lawmaking , 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 911, 965 (2011) (discussing the relationship between the Reception Clause, recognition, and head-of- 
state immunity). Note that the relationship between head-of-state immunity and recognition suggests that 
the  president  has  the  power  to  make legally  binding  head-of-state  immunity  determinations.  See  
Keitner, supra note 173, at 71–72. This argument is inconsistent with Bellia and Clark’s approach. The 
U.S. government has argued that the executive branch controls immunity determinations not governed by  
the FSIA. But see Wuerth, supra note 19, at 921 (arguing against executive branch control of immunity).  
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do not follow from recognition. For example, what officials other than the head 
of state are entitled to this form of immunity? A Prime Minister? A Secretary of 
State? Minister of Defense? Head of Parliament? Are they immune in criminal 
cases alleging violations of  jus cogens norms?176  The President’s decision about  
recognition does not answer these questions about the content and scope of im-
munity law. Moving from status to conduct-based immunity, the issues multiply 
dramatically, as the basic contours of conduct-based immunity are at least argu-
ably unsettled under domestic and international law. 177 
Bellia and Clark argue that customary international law applies as a function of 
the recognition power. That is, courts must apply the international law of state-to- 
state relations  and  confer  immunity “unless  and until”  the political  branches  
“take action” to abrogate such immunity.178  This argument misunderstands how 
customary international law  works.  Custom  is  by  nature  unwritten  and  often 
framed in general terms, in part because it is not subject to negotiation over spe-
cific language and terms, in contrast to how statutes, treaties, and much soft law  
are created.179 To apply customary international law is itself to make or reinforce 
customary international law. Courts do not merely apply an extant body of law 
until directed otherwise. The term “common law,” used by the Supreme Court to 
describe the law of immunity in areas not covered by the FSIA, is a far better 
description of what courts actually do than the view offered by Bellia and Clark. 
There is another problem with the direct application of customary international 
law to issues of immunity. In some countries, including the United States, many 
questions of foreign state and individual immunity have been resolved by statute, 
making it difficult to distinguish between the requirements of domestic and inter-
national law. 180 Issues such as waiver, commercial activity, and the status of enti-
ties  as  agencies  and instrumentalities  of  the  foreign  states will  be relevant  to 
resolving claims against individuals who are arguably entitled to immunity, but 
they are also relevant in cases brought directly against the state under the FSIA. 
In these situations, individual immunity determinations should be consistent with 
the FSIA even if the statute is not controlling. 181  
176.  See  Beth  Van  Schaack, Immunities  and Criminal  Prosecution  within  the  United  States  &  
Beyond,  JUST  SECURITY (July  9,  2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/12679/immunities-criminal-  
prosecution-united-states/  [https://perma.cc/96Y3-DEHC]  (noting  the  argument  that  “[w]hen  a  state 
violates international law or a  jus cogens norm, it essentially waives any immunities from suit for itself  
or its agents”).  
177.  See Beth Stephens, The Modern Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity , 79 FORDHAM  L.  
REV. 2669, 2704 (2011); Ingrid Wuerth, Pinochet’s Legacy Reassessed, 106 AM. J. INT’L  L. 731, 731  
(2012).  
178.  BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 1, at 198.  
179.  See Laurence  R. Helfer  &  Ingrid  B.  Wuerth, Customary International  Law:  An  Instrument  
Choice Perspective, 37 MICH. J. INT’L L. 563, 567–68, 573–80 (2016).  
180.  See FOX & WEBB, supra note 166, at 20–24, 218–22.  
181.  See Wuerth, supra note 19, at 945–48.  
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IV. THE FUTURE (AND A PARTIAL DEFENSE) OF THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF  
FOREIGN  RELATIONS 
For those who do not see the Constitution’s text and history as posing difficul-
ties for federal common lawmaking, the act of state and immunity-related doc-
trines are unproblematic. For those who do, however, it is better to conclude—as 
some  have—that  state law should apply, 182  than  to  distort  beyond  recognition 
existing precedent. But the best approach to both act of state and immunity-related 
issues is to acknowledge that they are narrow areas of federal common lawmaking,  
even  if  in  some  tension  with  the  text  and  structure  of  the  Constitution. 
Accepting federal common law in these two areas of foreign relations law does 
not depend upon characterizing  customary international law as federal com-
mon law, nor does it depend upon the traditional justification that foreign rela-
tions issues are uniquely federal in nature. The future of the federal common 
law  of  foreign relations  is accordingly  different  from  the  immediate  past, 
which justified much of the federal common law of foreign relations on those 
grounds. Federal common law in act of state and immunity related areas is jus-
tified instead because international law, federal statutes, and stare decisis all 
function to reduce the Article III, Supremacy Clause, and separation of powers 
problems associated with federal common law. 183 In particular, contemporary 
federal  common law, especially  that  governing  immunity, allows  courts  to 
give effect to very closely related statutory frameworks. 
Article III poses potential constitutional difficulties because federal common 
law arguably does not qualify as “laws of the United States” and thus cannot pro-
vide a constitutional basis for the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
Although scholars have worked to establish that customary international law is 
(or is not) included in Article III as the “laws of the United States”, 184 very little, 
if any, current doctrine depends upon classifying customary international law in  
this way. After Sosa, Alien Tort Statute litigation satisfies Article III not because 
customary international law is federal common law, but because Congress dele-
gated to the courts the power to create federal common law causes of action. 185 A 
federal common law cause of action confers federal question jurisdiction because 
cases “arise under” the law that creates the cause of action. 186 Federal common 
law provides subject matter jurisdiction in ATS cases exactly as it does in non- 
182. Goldsmith,  supra note 22, at 1624–25; see also Peter B. Rutledge, Samantar, Official Immunity 
and Federal Common Law , 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 589, 606 (2011) (arguing that courts should not 
give federal common law immunity to government officials).  
183.  See supra notes 19–24 and accompanying text.  
184.  See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that an ATS suit 
satisfied Article III because customary international law  is part of federal common law); William S.  
Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some Observations on Text and Context , 42 VA.  
J. INT’L L. 687, 701 (2002).  
185.  See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text.  
186.  See Am. Well  Works  Co.  v.  Layne  & Bowler  Co.,  241  U.S.  257,  260  (1916); Carlos  M.  
Vázquez, Alien Tort Claims and the Status of Customary International Law , 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 531,  
535 (2012).  
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foreign relations cases. 187 Cases involving the act of state doctrine, or foreign offi-
cial immunity and those raising  Bancec issues, do not involve a federal common 
law causes of action; federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction based on di-
versity  or  a federal  statute  such  as  the  Foreign  Sovereign  Immunities  Act. 188 
There is no Article III issue. 
Lower courts have occasionally reasoned or assumed that the act of state doc-
trine itself, or an issue of individual official immunity itself, or foreign relations 
issues  more generally,  confer  subject  matter  jurisdiction  on  the federal  courts. 
Some of these lower court cases find subject matter jurisdiction in act of state 
cases based on the “important foreign policy” issues raised by the case or similar  
reasoning.189 These cases are based on unconvincing exceptionalist grounds and 
have become increasingly rare during the past decade. 190 In recent foreign official 
immunitycases, lower courts have sometimes incorrectly assumed without analysis 
that if an individual is immune from suit under federal common law, the court lacks  
subject matter jurisdiction.191 That is how the immunity of foreign states is handled  
under the FSIA,192 but there is no federal statute conferring or withholding sub-
ject matter jurisdiction on or from the federal courts based on an individual 
immunity determination. In the rare immunity-related case in which federal 
courts lack statutorily-conferred subject matter jurisdiction, based for exam-
ple on diversity or the presence of a federal question, the case belongs in state  
court  on  statutory grounds.  State  courts  have historically resolved  foreign 
sovereign and related individual immunity issues without a problem. 193 
Supremacy Clause problems are vitiated if federal common law does not pre-
empt  state law  but  instead resolves  issues  that lie  beyond  state lawmaking  
187.  See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) (“[Section] 1331 jurisdiction will 
support claims founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory origin.”)  
188.  See, e.g., First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 615 
(1983) (diversity); Arch Trading Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, 839 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2016) (FSIA). The 
Supreme Court has held that the FSIA’s grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the federal courts in cases 
against foreign sovereigns comes within Article III’s grant of jurisdiction over cases that arise under the 
laws of the United States, even if the FSIA does not create the cause of action. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent.  
Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 495 (1983).  
189.  See, e.g., Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1997) (“On the record before 
us  we  must conclude  that plaintiffs’ complaint  raises substantial  questions  of federal  common law  by 
implicating important foreign policy concerns.”).  
190.  See,  e.g.,  Patrickson  v. Dole  Food  Co.,  251  F.3d  795,  803  (9th  Cir.  2001),  aff’d  in  part,  
dismissed  in  part,  538  U.S.  468  (2003) (declining  to follow  Torres and similar  cases); Delgado  v.  
Zaragoza, 267 F. Supp. 3d 892, 897 (W.D. Tex. 2016) (describing how Torres has been limited).  
191.  See, e.g., Lewis v. Mutond, 258 F. Supp. 3d 168, 174 (D.D.C. 2017); Mireskandari v. Mayne, 
No. CV-123861-JGB (MRWx), 2016 WL 1165896, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2016).  
192.  28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2012).  
193.  See,  e.g.,  Waters  v. Collot,  2  U.S.  (2 Dall.)  247,  248  (1796); Wulfsohn  v.  Russian Socialist 
Federated Soviet Republic, 138 N.E. 24, 25–26 (N.Y. 1923); Hassard v. United States of Mexico, 29  
Misc.  511,  512  (N.Y.  Sup.  Ct.  1899). See generally  Chimène  I.  Keitner,  The  Forgotten  History  of 
Foreign Official Immunity , 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 704, 713–29, 737–40 (2012) (describing Waters and other 
late-eighteenth century cases); Julian G. Ku, Customary International Law in State Courts , 42 VA. J.  
INT’L  L. 265, 292–99, 307–32 (2001) (describing foreign sovereign and other immunity cases in state  
courts).  
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power.194 Thus Bellia  and Clark  argue (unconvincingly)  that  the  recognition 
power of the Constitution disables states from making law on issues of state-to- 
state relations. 195 But there is an important statutory argument that scholars have 
overlooked: the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the background assumptions 
it incorporated, and related statutes have “federalized” the fields of official and  
state immunity.196 That argument is strongest for the attribution issues involved  
in Bancec. Federal law comprehensivly regulates issues of foreign state immunity 
and, for the purposes of immunity, explicitly respects the separate corporate form 
of agencies and instrumentalities. 197 Although the text of the statute does not con-
trol the issue of corporate form for the purposes of liablity, 198  disregarding sepa-
rate juridical status for the purposes of liability would undermine the statute, as 
the legislative history makes clear. 199 The question of when separate juridicial 
status may be disregarded is thus regulated by federal common law. Federal com-
mon law governs similar issues in connection with many other federal statutes. 200 
Individual immunity, like the attribution issue in  Bancec, is not governed by  
the  FSIA.201 Here,  too,  however,  the law  governing individual  immunities  is 
extremely closely linked to the law governing foreign  state  immunity.  Indeed, 
individuals are only entitled to “official” immunity due to their relationship with  
a foreign state, and foreign state immunity is governed by the FSIA. The purpose 
of individual  immunities  is  to  protect  foreign  states  by  protecting  the officials 
who work on their behalf. 202 In many contexts, it would make little sense to apply 
different rules to foreign state and official immunity. Doing so would undermine 
the FSIA itself in areas such as waiver, commercial activity, and the status of enti-
ties as agencies and instrumentalities of the foreign states. 203 
The  Supreme  Court  reached  a similar conclusion  in Boyle  v.  United 
Technologies  Corp.,  in  which  it held  that  the liability  of military  contractors 
“arising out of the performance of federal procurement contracts” is governed by  
194.  See Nelson, supra note 15, at 4–5.  
195.  See supra Part II.  
196.  See Nelson, supra note 15, at 5 (quoting Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law , 76 B.  
U. L. REV. 895, 914 (1996)).  
197.  See  28  U.S.C.  §§  1603(a)-(b)  (distinguishing  between  foreign  states  and  their  agencies  and 
instrumentalities);  id. § 1605(a)(3) (distinguishing the immunity available to foreign states from that 
available to agencies and instrumentalities). 
198.  First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 620 (1983).  
199.  See id. at 627–28 (discussing the legislative history of FSIA § 1610(b), dealing with execution  
of judgments).  
200.  See Sarah C. Haan, Federalizing the Foreign Corporate Form , 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 925, 990–  
91 (2011) (discussing the Packers and Stockyards Act, the Sherman Act, the Trading With the Enemy 
Act,  and  various federal labor laws, including  ERISA,  the  Worker  Adjustment  and  Retraining 
Notification Act of 1988, COBRA, and the Railway Labor Act, among others).  
201.  Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325 (2010).  
202.  See  Dapo Akande  & Sangeeta Shah, Immunities  of State Offcials, International  Crimes,  and  
Foreign Domestic Courts, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 815, 822–24, 826–27 (2010); see also  Jones v. Ministry of 
the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26, [2007] 1 AC (HL) 270 (appeal taken  
from EWCA (Civ)).  
203.  See Wuerth, supra note 19, at 945–48.  
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federal common law. 204 A federal statute provided a defense to such suits for gov-
ernment officials, but not for private contractors. 205 The Court created a federal 
common law  defense  for  private  contractors  because  some  suits  against  them 
would  “produce  the  same  effect  sought  to  be  avoided  by  the  FTCA  exemp- 
tion.”206 Similar reasoning applies to suits against individual foreign officials and  
foreign heads of state: suits against them under circumstances in which the state 
itself would be immune would undermine the state itself. 
Professor Clark has offered a defense of Boyle, arguing that the case should be 
understood in terms of “constitutional preemption,” not federal common law. 207 
Although Clark’s characterization of Boyle as involving constitutional preemp-
tion is debatable—a federal  statute is doing the preemptive work in that case— 
his perceptive anlysis of McCulloch v. Maryland 208  and Osborn v. Bank of the  
United States209 supports the result in Boyle and also supports the application of 
federal  common law  in individual  immunity  cases.  In  both McCulloch  and  
Osborn the Court invalidated state efforts to tax the Bank of the United States, 
although the Bank was not a public institution and the statutes in question did 
expressly exempt the bank from taxation. 210 The Osborn Court reasoned that “[i]t 
is  not unusual,  for  a legislative  act  to involve  consequences  which  are  not 
expressed” and cited in support the immunity of federal officers as an example. 211 
Such immunity is “incidental to, and is implied in, the several acts by which these  
institutions are created.”212 If individual immunities are incidental to the statutory 
creation of institutions, individual immunities are also incidental to the statutory 
conferral of immunity on the foreign state represented by that individual. Finally, 
immunity does not involve a substantive resolution of the case, it is merely a pro-
cedural  bar  to  the litigation,  a  distinction  which  reduces  separation  of  powers  
concerns.213 
The same reasoning at least arguably applies to the act of state doctrine, 
which is closely linked to foreign sovereign immunity. Both doctrines limit,  
in part, the power of domestic courts to deprive sovereign states of their prop-
erty interests. Indeed, after the FSIA was enacted, considerable concern arose  
204. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 506 (1988).  
205.  Id. at 531 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
206.  See id. at 511 (majority opinion). 
207.  Bradford R. Clark, Boyle as Constitutional Preemption , 92 NOTRE  DAME L. REV. 2129, 2134  
(2017).  
208.  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).  
209.  22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
210. Clark,  supra note 207, at 2135, 2137–38.  
211.  Id. at 2137 (quoting Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 865).  
212.  Id. (quoting Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 865).  
213.  See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 140 (2018) (expressing particular concern with 
separation of powers when federal common law creates causes of action because “the Legislature, which 
is better positioned ‘to consider if the public interest would be served by imposing a new substantive 
legal liability’”(quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017))).  
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that the act of state doctrine would undermine the statute. 214  The Court has sub-
stantially limited the act of state doctrine, however, 215 minimizing the opportuni- 
ties for conflict.216 Stare decisis and the very limited scope of the doctrine today 
provide  better  justifications  for  common lawmaking  in  this  area,  as  does  the 
implicit approval of Congress for the act of state doctrine through the FSIA itself 
and the Hickenlooper Amendment. Legislative history to the FSIA suggests that  
Congress intended to preserve the doctrine;217 the Hickenlooper Amendment has 
the same effect by limiting, but not eliminating, it. 218 
Finally,  the  separation  of  powers  objection  to federal  common law, namely 
that judges should not engage in lawmaking, 219 are minimal in the act of state and 
immunity-related contexts. As Caleb Nelson has described, “even if all common 
law is properly characterized as ‘judge-made,’ one should not leap to the conclu-
sion that each individual court brings common-law rules into being in the way 
that  a legislature  might  enact  a  new  statute.” 220 Nelson  distinguishes  between 
rules that judges create “out of whole cloth” and rules that are “firmly grounded 
in sources outside the federal judiciary.” 221 The federal common law doctrines in 
the area of foreign relations are highly constrained, and not just by stare decisis. 
Decisions related to immunity are hemmed in by the FSIA and the content of cus-
tomary international law. Both doctrines are constrained to some degree by the 
views of the executive branch, which may be relevant to determining which enti-
ties qualify as foreign states entitled to protection under either doctrine. 222  
CONCLUSION 
Today’s federal common law of foreign relations rests neither upon broad gen-
eralizations about the exceptional nature of foreign relations, nor upon judicial 
assessment of foreign relations dangers, nor upon the classification of customary 
international law as federal common law. Instead, in its current and very limited 
form,  it  is  best  understood  and  best legitimated  as fundamentally interstitial,  
214.  See, e.g., Ifeanyi Achebe, The Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of  
1976: Can They Coexist?, 13 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 247, 248 (1989).  
215.  See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990).  
216.  See Hon. Marianne D. Short & Charles H. Brower, II,  The Taming of the Shrew: May the Act of  
State Doctrine and Foreign Sovereign Immunity Eat and Drink as Friends?, 20 HAMLINE L. REV. 723, 
738 (1997) (“Not surprisingly, jurists and scholars initially voiced concern that the act of state doctrine 
might devour the FSIA’s commercial exception. However, the Supreme Court’s recent decision . . . [in  
Kirkpatrick] makes such fears unwarranted.”).  
217.  See id. at 732 n.81.  
218.  See Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine , 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325, 392–96 
(1986) (describing various legislative attempts to limit the act of state doctrine, including the enactment 
of the Hickenlooper Amendment).  
219.  See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
220. Nelson,  supra note 15, at 7 (internal citation omitted).  
221.  Id. at 9.  
222.  See William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law , 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2133  
(2015);  Wuerth,  supra  note  19,  at  970.  The  executive  branch  does  not  have  the  power  to  determine 
which entities qualify as foreign states under the FSIA.  See RESTATEMENT  (FOURTH) OF  THE  FOREIGN  
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 452, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., forthcoming 2018).  
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limited largely by federal statutes but also by international law and stare decisis, 
all of which minimize potential constitutional objections. Bellia and Clark offer a 
different  way  to  avoid constitutional  objections:  reconceiving  the  doctrines  as 
constitutional law itself, not federal common law. Their argument, if succesful, 
would strike a blow to federal common law as a whole, a point that their book 
does  not  emphasize. Although  their  argument  is ultimately  unconvincing,  the 
book serves as an erudite and challenging reminder that the federal common law 
of  foreign relations  was long  overdue  for  stocktaking  and reevaluation,  which 
this Article has endeavored to provide.   
